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Introduction 
 
 
Balancing on the Brink 
Lebanon, Tangled up in the Syrian war, Struggles to Maintain Its Stability 
Heiko Wimmen 
So far, the Syrian war and the involvement of Lebanese actors in it has not spread to 
Lebanon, despite the fears of many. In spite of irreconcilable differences on the Syrian 
issue, Lebanon’s political camps have reached a fragile consensus that makes it possible 
for political institutions to function at least rudimentarily and for the security situa-
tion to be provisionally stabilized. However, this consensus remains precarious and 
threatened by the ambitions of Lebanese actors and by regional tensions. Moreover, 
Hezbollah’s active involvement in the Syria conflict steadily increases the likelihood of 
a renewed military confrontation with Israel. Germany and its European partners must 
do their part to pre-empt such a confrontation, to support the dialogue between the 
Lebanese parties through mediation, and to stop regional tensions from spilling over. 
 
The four-year-old war in Syria has put Leba-
non to the toughest test since its own civil 
war ended in 1990. This small country 
of not quite four million inhabitants has 
taken in at least 1.2 million Syrians, who 
are a serious burden on its chronically 
underfunded welfare system. The critical 
security situation and the loss of many 
transit routes through Syria have substan-
tially affected trade and tourism, two of 
the most important sectors of the economy. 
The biggest danger, however, is that the 
country’s most powerful political forces 
have taken up diametrically opposed posi-
tions on the conflict in neighboring Syria. 
The predominantly Sunni Future move-
ment, led by the Saudi-Lebanese Hariri 
family, has sided with the rebels. During 
the conflict’s first phase, it helped to 
recruit and equip them, supported by state 
and private sponsors from the Arab Gulf 
states. The Shiite Hezbollah, on the other 
hand, has been fighting on the side of the 
Syrian regime since the autumn of 2012, 
at first secretly, and then, as of May 2013, 
openly. In the process, it has been collabo-
rating with the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard and Shiite Iraqi militias. Since that 
date of May 2013 at the latest, the commit-
ment to avoid turning the country into 
a transit area or source for weapons or 
fighters and to remain neutral on regional 
conflicts – which all political forces in Leba-
non had formally made in June 2012 – has 
not been worth the paper it was written on. 
Lebanon thus faces a triple challenge. 
First, the opposing stances on the Syrian 
conflict quickly blocked political institu-
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tions. Second, the Syrian civil war, and the 
rivalry between the two regional powers 
Saudi Arabia and Iran that lies behind it, 
is increasingly seen as part of a denomina-
tional conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. 
Because of this, there is a risk that the rifts 
between Lebanese Sunnis and Shiites will 
deepen and lead, in the worst-case scenario, 
to a violent confrontation. Third, Hez-
bollah’s direct involvement in the Syrian 
conflict is causing a noticeable shift in 
the organization’s strategic capacities and 
orientation. This increases the risk of a 
renewed armed confrontation with Israel. 
The Erosion of Institutions 
For over a decade, Lebanon has been the 
setting for persistent disputes over the new 
balance of power in the region. After the 
withdrawal of the Syrian occupying troops 
in the spring of 2005, and the war between 
Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, 
the US, the EU and pro-Western Arab states 
encouraged the Future movement and its 
allies to detach Lebanon entirely from the 
Syrian-Iranian sphere of influence. Hez-
bollah, on the other hand, sought to keep 
the country on the side of the “resistance” 
against the alleged hegemonic aspirations 
of the US and Israel, a resistance that was 
deemed to include Palestine’s Hamas as 
well as Syria and Iran. These fundamental 
differences inevitably caused a blockage of 
the political institutions, since the Lebanese 
political system is organized so as to ensure 
consensus and balance between the religious 
and denominational groups, and only allows 
for majority decisions to a very limited ex-
tent. Fighting between the two camps first 
broke out in May 2008, ending in a clear 
victory for Hezbollah and its allies, and in 
a fragile compromise. Against the back-
ground of this eruption of violence, Presi-
dent Michel Suleiman, elected after the 
fighting, and Prime Minister Najib Mikati, 
who had been in office since February 2011 
and was likewise considered an independ-
ent, both advocated strict neutrality on the 
conflict in Syria. 
However, in the spring of 2013, when 
Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil 
war became increasingly obvious, the Mikati 
government had no choice but to resign, 
leaving the political system once again 
paralysed. For almost a year, all attempts 
at forming a new government failed. The 
irreconcilable differences between the two 
camps also scuppered the passage of a new 
electoral law, as the precise design of this 
law had the potential of shifting the major-
ity ratio by a few decisive seats. Parliamen-
tary elections, due in June 2013, were post-
poned indefinitely, and Parliament, elected 
in 2009, used a constitutionally dubious 
procedure to extend its period of office by 
17 months. However, boycotts by various 
factions meant that it remained inquorate 
to begin with. 
In the spring of 2014, with the Suleiman 
presidency due to come to an end on 31 
May, an almost total institutional vacuum 
loomed. With no prospect of a successor 
being elected, the president’s responsibili-
ties would under the constitution have 
devolved onto a caretaker government with 
narrowly restricted powers. Such a govern-
ment is unable to initiate legislation with-
out a functioning parliament. It was only at 
this point, in February 2014, that all politi-
cal forces came together to form a so-called 
National Unity Government. However, even 
this has been hamstrung by recurrent quar-
rels over voting rules and responsibilities. 
Moreover, after a second postponement of 
parliamentary elections in November 2014, 
its legitimacy looks increasingly question-
able. Political decisions that are both neces-
sary and, for the Lebanese people, of existen-
tial importance are falling by the wayside, 
including decisions on funding the long 
overdue and already agreed-on public sec-
tor pay reforms or on curbing the scandal-
ous conditions in the food industry. Insti-
tutional erosion has long since reached the 
Lebanese armed forces as well. An endless 
tug-of-war over new appointments to the 
highest command posts has entailed legally 
suspect extensions to the mandates of cur-
rent officeholders here too. 
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The reason for the many blockages lies 
in the fact that Lebanese political actors 
adapt their conduct to the strategic inter-
ests of their rival foreign patrons, first and 
foremost Iran and Saudi Arabia, and often 
pursue their individual and personal goals 
in the slipstream of this confrontation. In 
addition, there is insecurity over the out-
come of the nuclear negotiations between 
Iran and the P5+1, and over the medium-
term repercussions on the regional power 
balance of a successful implementation – or 
not – of the framework agreement reached 
in Lausanne in early April. All this makes 
it impossible for Lebanon’s political actors 
reliably to gauge the long-term conse-
quences of compromises on the distribu-
tion of power and posts. The top echelons 
of state institutions therefore look set to 
remain blocked for the time being. Apart 
from initiatives by individual ministers, 
government activity will remain at an 
absolute minimum. 
Stabilizing the Security Situation 
In contrast, the spillover of the Syrian war 
into Lebanon, feared by many, has so far 
failed to materialize. This is primarily due 
to the fact that, despite Lebanon’s political 
polarization, neither of the camps can 
expect to benefit from an armed confron-
tation. On the one side, Hezbollah has com-
mitted a large part of its military capacity 
in Syria. It is therefore not interested in con-
frontations on the home front, especially 
since the status quo suits it. Hezbollah’s 
combat units have a disciplined command 
structure, and the organization has its own 
security service to monitor Shiite popula-
tion centres, not least because of several 
devastating bomb attacks in 2013 and 2014. 
On the side of Hezbollah, this all but pre-
cludes unchecked escalation, for example 
in the form of spontaneous clashes with 
supporters of the Future movement in 
mixed-denomination or neighboring city 
districts. 
The other side looks noticeably more 
complex. The Future movement might 
complain at every available opportunity 
about Hezbollah maintaining a military 
apparatus that is outside of state control, 
but since its humiliating defeat in the 
armed confrontations of May 2008, the 
Hariri party has realized that it can neither 
match Hezbollah militarily nor expect 
support from its Western or Arab allies in 
this regard. It is therefore endeavouring 
to de-escalate the situation. However, one 
result of this politically responsible shift 
in strategy is that the movement has lost 
much of its authority at the radical end of 
the Sunni spectrum. Since 2008, groups 
that are ideologically orientated towards 
Al-Qaeda have shown noticeable growth. 
This tendency has been reinforced by the 
fact that the Syrian civil war is increasingly 
seen as a combat between a “Shiite” regime 
sponsored by Iran and the majority Sunni 
population. Furthermore, the creation of 
covert networks that support the rebels has 
encouraged the militarization of the radical 
Sunni fringe in Lebanon. In 2012 and 2013 
there were repeated exchanges of fire be-
tween such groups and the security forces. 
Some spokespersons of the Future move-
ment defended the creation of these net-
works as a purely self-protective reaction to 
Hezbollah’s display of power, and criticized 
the collaboration of the Lebanese army with 
that organization. They thus gave the im-
pression, at least temporarily, of secretly 
condoning the existence of jihadist cur-
rents or even cooperating with them. 
However, as increasingly extreme groups 
such as the so-called Islamic State (IS) and 
the al-Nusra Front advanced onto Lebanese 
territory from the autumn of 2014 onwards, 
the Future movement distanced itself ever 
more firmly from this milieu and showed a 
few particularly radical followers the door. 
Since December 2014, the party has been 
involved in a formal dialogue with Hez-
bollah, which has helped to reduce Sunni-
Shiite tensions and made it easier to con-
trol especially conflict-laden localities. For 
instance, the fighting between Sunnis and 
Alawites in the northern port town of Tri-
poli, which had previously flared up again 
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and again, has been contained. That truce 
held even after a bomb attack in January 
2015 caused nine deaths. Further success 
came with the destruction of a central 
command post for terrorist activities that 
jihadist inmates had established in Rou-
mieh’s main prison under the very eyes of 
the apparently powerless security authori-
ties. In addition, the close collaboration of 
Hezbollah and the Lebanese army against 
jihadist groups that advance into the Beqaa 
Valley from Syria was prevented from com-
promising the armed forces’ legitimacy 
among Lebanese Sunnis. 
In fact, the army has weathered several 
rounds of military confrontations with 
(Lebanese and foreign) jihadis without any 
negative effects on its cohesion. Moreover, 
each time it prevailed over the extremists 
or beat back their attacks. In addition, Leba-
nese Sunnis have shown very little soli-
darity with the fighters trickling in from 
Syria. Confessional geography has been 
helpful in this respect. An estimated 3,000 
jihadi combatants did manage to establish 
themselves in the impassable mountains 
along the Syrian-Lebanese border in the 
Beqaa Valley and in the surroundings of the 
Sunni-dominated small town of Arsal. How-
ever, this area is bordered to the west and 
south by territories settled by Christian and 
Shiites, where both the Army and Hezbol-
lah enjoy broad support. Numerous reports 
point out that the al-Nusra Front and IS – 
which elsewhere tend to fight each other, 
but which partly collaborate in this region 
– are gathering forces in the Syrian-Leba-
nese border area for a spring offensive. This 
may be aimed just as much against the stra-
tegically important road linking Damascus 
and the central Syrian town of Homs. In 
contrast, further advances into Lebanon 
would bring hardly any strategic benefits, 
nor would they be very promising against 
the united forces of the Lebanese military 
and Hezbollah. 
At first sight, northern Lebanon would 
seem to offer a better starting-point for 
jihadis because the population of the Akkar 
district is largely homogenous in being 
Sunni and socially marginalized, and 
because the mainly Sunni port city of Tri-
poli is already a centre for jihadi networks. 
However, the Assad regime largely controls 
the Syrian side of the border and thus pre-
vents jihadist groups from penetrating into 
this part of Lebanon. In addition, the army 
is an important employer especially in the 
impoverished north, and thus enjoys the re-
spect of large parts of the population there. 
Ever since the jihadis murdered several 
captured Lebanese soldiers in late 2014, they 
have no longer been able to count on local 
sympathies. The possibility of further attacks 
by underground networks (as occurred in 
2013 and 2014) on Shiite or Hezbollah-con-
trolled areas or on state institutions, above 
all in the security sector, cannot be totally 
excluded. However, the actual threat of 
such groups for the general security situa-
tion seems, on the whole, manageable – 
on the condition that the Lebanese armed 
forces be allowed to deploy their capacities 
fully and without interference by politi-
cians whose grassroots sympathize with 
jihadi groups. 
Against the expectations of many ob-
servers, the huge number of Syrian refugees 
who have sought shelter in Lebanon has 
not substantially exacerbated the internal 
conflicts nor destabilized the security situa-
tion either. It is true that in some hotspots, 
especially in the border area of the eastern 
Beqaa Valley, gatherings of refugees are 
believed to serve as a refuge and cover for 
jihadi militants, and that some of these 
refugees are believed to collaborate with 
Lebanese groups. However, the overwhelm-
ing majority of refugees keep their distance 
from militants. Of course, many of them 
are desperate given the dramatic funding 
gap in international humanitarian aid. 
Aid currently stands at only 10 percent of 
the about two billion US dollars a year 
estimated as necessary by the UN refugee 
agency, UNHCR. Concerns that young men 
will increasingly be recruited by extremist 
groups using financial incentives must 
therefore be taken seriously. In spite of the 
remarkable readiness to help shown by 
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the Lebanese, there are signs that even 
their capacity and acceptance have limits. 
Analyses point to a constantly growing 
sense of threat, which could be socially 
explosive in the medium term. 
Hezbollah’s Regional 
Transformation 
In January 2015, the first direct exchange 
of blows took place between Israel and 
Hezbollah that had its origin in the organi-
zation’s armed engagement in Syria. An 
Israeli rocket attack on a Hezbollah convoy 
in the Syrian-controlled area of the Golan 
Heights on 18 January killed six of its 
fighters – including a son of the Hezbollah 
strategist Imad Mughniyah, who had been 
assassinated in Damascus in 2008 – and an 
Iranian officer. Ten days later, in an attack 
that it explicitly declared to be an act of 
reprisal, Hezbollah killed two Israeli sol-
diers and wounded seven others in the 
Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian border area. 
At first sight, the trajectory of these in-
cidents confirms that neither side is cur-
rently interested in renewing their armed 
confrontation. Hezbollah’s choice of the 
Shebaa Farms, an area occupied by Israel 
and claimed by Lebanon, as the site of its 
reprisal kept the attack within the geo-
graphical frame of its previous “resistance 
operations”, for which reliable mechanisms 
of communication and de-escalation have 
been established since the 2006 war. Ac-
cording to Israeli sources, following the 
attack Hezbollah used diplomatic channels 
to communicate that it did not intend to 
escalate the violence further. In return, 
Israel limited itself to diplomatic protests 
and artillery fire on a largely uninhabited 
area, which did, however, claim the life of 
a Spanish UNIFIL soldier. 
And yet the Hezbollah operation marks 
a qualitative change in its strategy and out-
look. Until the spring of 2013, it had always 
explicitly presented itself as a national Leba-
nese organization and depicted its military 
activities as the liberation or defense of 
Lebanese territory. In a speech on 30 Janu-
ary 2015, General Secretary Hassan Nas-
rallah proclaimed that “the resistance no 
longer cares about rules of engagement”. 
He underlined Hezbollah’s aspirations to 
become active in all strategically relevant 
military locations regardless of existing 
state borders. With this, he formally con-
firmed Hezbollah’s transformation into an 
organization with a transnational military 
role. It is now a part of a group of state 
actors (the Syrian and Iraqi governments), 
quasi-state actors (the autonomous Kurdish 
government in northern Iraq), and non-
state actors (alongside Palestine’s Hamas, 
Yemen’s Houthi rebels, the Kurdish Demo-
cratic Union Party in north-eastern Syria, 
and Shiite Iraqi militias), whose interests 
at least partly coincide with Iran’s, or for 
whom Iran is an important source of ex-
ternal support. They therefore collaborate 
with Tehran, if to varying degrees. 
This development has considerable 
potential for escalation. The expansion of 
Hezbollah’s area of operations to include 
Syria already generates a great number of 
potential conflict scenarios, for which there 
are, in contrast to southern Lebanon, no 
established mediation mechanisms. The 
mere presence of Hezbollah units in an 
additional sector near its northern border 
is causing Israel great concern. Israeli mili-
tary observers furthermore assume that 
since the 2006 war, Hezbollah has substan-
tially replenished its military equipment 
and noticeably expanded its strategic capac-
ities. Presumably, this tendency has been 
reinforced by its military engagement in 
Syria. The close operational collaboration 
between Hezbollah and the Iranian Revo-
lutionary Guard in the Syria conflict also 
modifies the organization’s previous status 
as a guerrilla force that received support 
from outside Lebanon but was active ex-
clusively within it. From an Israeli perspec-
tive, Hezbollah now acts within a regionally 
integrated structure dominated by Iran. It 
thus constitutes an Iranian military presence 
in the immediate vicinity of Israel’s borders, 
but without any possibility of holding 
Tehran accountable for Hezbollah’s actions. 
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This change in Hezbollah’s role, activities 
and area of operations constitutes a quali-
tatively new threat for Israel. 
Conclusions 
In spite of their extremely different stances 
on the Syrian crisis, Lebanon’s political 
actors were able to avoid a collapse of the 
political institutions in the spring of 2014. 
In the autumn of 2014, faced with the threat 
of jihadi groups advancing from Syria, all 
political actors finally and unconditionally 
stood behind the Lebanese security and 
armed forces, and accepted their close col-
laboration with Hezbollah. The immediate 
military threat was thus averted. In addi-
tion, tensions between parts of the Sunni 
population and the army were reduced, 
and a split along denominational lines 
was prevented at an early stage. Despite its 
serious internal rifts, the Lebanese political 
sphere is thus clearly capable of producing 
compromises in acutely difficult circum-
stances. The fact that this generally occurs 
only at the very edge of the abyss remains 
a cause for serious concern, as the risk of 
fatal misjudgements (such as occurred in 
2008) persists. The postponement of parlia-
mentary elections by a further 31 months 
in November 2014, and the failure of all 
attempts to elect a new president, show 
how limited this ability to reach a com-
promise is. For this reason, effective govern-
ance remains impossible; and ever new 
crises call the brittle minimal consensus 
into question time and again. 
The external dynamic 
External influences continue to be a power-
ful factor of uncertainty. Some observers 
ascribe the partial stabilization of the Leba-
nese political system to a tacit consent to 
neutralize Lebanon, reached by Iran on the 
one side and Saudi Arabia and the US on 
the other. However, this arrangement, if 
it exists, could change quickly once one or 
several of the external actors involved re-
appraise their strategic interests. In this 
context, the broader dynamic in the power 
struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
remains a substantial unknown. The ques-
tion arises, for instance, whether a success-
ful conclusion to the nuclear negotiations 
between the P5+1 and Iran really will reduce 
tensions in the region. Many observers fear 
that, on the contrary, an internationally 
rehabilitated Iran – which will also have 
noticeably more resources at its disposal 
after sanctions have been lifted – will pur-
sue its strategic interests even more em-
phatically. They also suspect that Western 
states might be ever more inclined to 
accept Iran as an unloved but effective de 
facto ally against Islamist extremists such 
as IS. Inversely, Saudi Arabia and its allies 
might try to pre-empt such a development 
by committing themselves more strongly to 
the various trouble spots. Many signs point 
to the second scenario, especially the air 
strikes begun on 25 March, which saw ten 
Arab states fly attacks on targets in Yemen, 
under Saudi leadership. The fragile under-
standing between the political blocs in 
Beirut would undoubtedly be taxed by such 
a development. However, for the time being 
they mostly realize that they must hold 
on to their pragmatic minimal consensus. 
Thus Saad Hariri, the leader of the Future 
movement, condemned the latest verbal 
attacks on the Saudi leadership by Hez-
bollah’s General Secretary Hassan Nasral-
lah, but emphasized at the same time that 
dialogue would continue. 
A conflict with Israel is still the 
greatest danger 
In the medium term, the greatest danger 
for Lebanon derives from Hezbollah’s new 
regional role. Like Saudi Arabia, Israel – and 
notably its Prime Minister Benjamin Netan-
yahu, re-elected in March 2015 – views the 
nuclear negotiations between Iran and the 
P5+1 with a great deal of scepticism, and 
fears an expansion of Iranian influence in 
the region. From an Israeli perspective, 
the steady increase in Hezbollah’s military 
capacity, especially its missile arsenal, must 
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surely constitute Israel’s strategic Achilles 
heel should the confrontation with Tehran 
intensify. Eliminating this capacity while 
that is still possible at reasonable cost – 
or at least perceptibly reducing it – might 
therefore seem an obvious choice. Politi-
cians on the Israeli right as well as experts 
from pro-Israel research institutes in the 
US are already calling a third Lebanon War 
probable, or even inevitable, in the medium 
term. Not least, this would allow Israel (with 
the tacit approval of several Arab states) 
to demonstrate to Iran the limits of its 
regional expansion without risking a mili-
tary confrontation with the country itself. 
Recommendations 
Compromises are unlikely to be reached on 
the most important political conflicts in 
Lebanon for the foreseeable future – such 
as the presidency, a new electoral law or 
parliamentary elections. For this reason, 
European and German mediation attempts 
should concentrate on decisions and pro-
cesses that are essential for preserving the 
delicate cooperation between Lebanese 
political actors. This is especially true for 
the pending nominations for top military 
posts. Already existing direct relationships 
between Lebanese political actors and Ger-
man institutions – for instance through the 
political foundations or actors involved in 
Track II diplomacy – need to be used so as 
to offer additional channels and forums for 
dialogue on neutral ground. 
Additional equipment and training for 
the Lebanese army would also provide a 
valuable contribution to stabilizing the 
security situation and strengthening one 
of the few institutions which still retains 
confidence across the denominations. In 
the process, it would be vital to avoid giving 
the impression that such support is aimed 
at influencing the army’s position vis-à-vis 
the political blocs. Finally, it is surely also 
in Germany’s interest to provide financial 
means that help to improve the disastrous 
humanitarian conditions for Syrian refugees 
in Lebanon. This could counter radicaliza-
tion and reduce the appeal of illegal migra-
tion to the EU. 
At the diplomatic level, attempts should 
to be made to shield the situation in Leba-
non from the repercussions of a potential 
escalation in other locations in the region, 
such as Iraq, Yemen and Syria. This would 
require exerting an influence to that effect 
on partners in the region, including Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Any 
positive momentum in Germany’s relation-
ship with Tehran, such as might result 
from successful negotiations on the Iranian 
nuclear programme and Germany’s role in 
them, should also be used for this purpose. 
There are still no reliable forums or 
mechanisms for conflict management in 
the region. Regional actors instead prefer 
strategies aimed at projecting or limiting 
the influence or hegemony over other 
states (such as Lebanon), which almost 
inevitably exacerbates internal conflicts 
there. The more international involvement 
limits itself to containing “terrorism”, and 
the more regional actors carry out internal 
and inter-state conflicts militarily, the more 
likely are further escalation, additional 
boosts for extremist forces, and fresh waves 
of refugees. 
Finally, concentrating on fighting terror 
and on ever new hotspots should not mean 
losing sight of chronic trouble spots – such 
as Israel, Palestine or the four-year-old civil 
war in Syria – which certainly have the po-
tential of triggering new military confron-
tations. Thus, a new round of confrontations 
between Israel and Hamas could at the 
same time easily provide the grounds for 
Israeli military actions against Hezbollah, 
for instance because of alleged connections 
between the two organizations. Equally, 
any renewed Israeli attacks on Hezbollah 
units in Syria could set off precisely the sort 
of escalation that was avoided in January. 
To help prevent this latter scenario among 
others, Germany and Europe need to remain 
involved in the UNIFIL mission on the Leba-
nese-Israeli border, and promote a con-
tinued UNDOF mission at the Israeli-Syrian 
ceasefire line in the Golan Heights. 
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